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ABSTRACT 
In the context of increased concern about the resilience of critical transport infrastructure to external events and 
the impact of such events on local tourism industries, this paper analyzes the ability of tourism-oriented airports 
to relocate departing passengers in the event of an unexpected airport closure. A case study of Palma de 
Mallorca Airport is presented. Using an MIDT dataset on passenger itineraries in August 2014, several closure 
scenarios are simulated, and disrupted passengers are relocated to minimum-delay itineraries. Aggregate delays 
and relocation rates are used to assess the impact of each scenario, with a particular focus on UK and Germany 
markets. The results provide useful benchmarks for the development of policies aimed at minimizing the impact 
on stranded tourists, such as allowing for passenger connections, establishing a protocol for interline 
cooperation, and improving intermodal transfers. These measures will help mitigate the negative impacts on 
airline loyalty and destination image. 
Keywords: Tourist airports; crisis management; passenger recovery; resilience; destination image. 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, a number of events have challenged the robustness of air transport services 
worldwide. These events negatively affect both passengers, particularly those departing or 
returning from their holidays at major tourist destinations, and airlines, which have a 
statutory responsibility to assist their disrupted passengers. The nature of each disruptive 
event varies, though most events are related to those most widely addressed in the literature 
on post-crisis recovery at tourism destinations, i.e., weather events and terrorist attacks (Mair 
et al., 2016). In 2010, the Volcanic Ash Cloud led to thousands of cancelled flights, millions 
of stranded tourists across Europe, and massive economic impacts (Mazzocchi et al., 2010). 
On a smaller scale, a volcanic eruption led to the closure of Bali International airport in 
November 2015, with the expected impact on tourists returning from holidays (BBC, 2015a). 
The closures of both London and Gatwick airports for several days in December 2010 due to 
heavy snowfall also left thousands of tourists trapped (BBC, 2010). In addition to weather 
conditions, industrial actions are also responsible for massive flight cancellations, particularly 
in periods of strong holiday demand: In late 2009, the entire Spanish airspace had to be 
closed due to a nationwide strike of air traffic controllers (ATC) at the beginning of the 
Constitution/Immaculate Conception holiday (El País, 2009). In March 2016, the French 
ATC strike affected European holidaymakers during the Easter period (BBC, 2016), 
continuing a trend from previous years. Between 2015 and 2016, several strikes (primarily 
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ATC and ground handling) also occurred in Italy, Spain, and Greece, causing many flight 
cancellations, as reported by the websites of Europe’s major low-cost carriers (LCCs). An 
industrial action was also an underlying cause of the collapse of Vueling operations at 
Barcelona airport in July 2016. In this case, however, the primary factor, as concluded by the 
Spanish Government, was the lack of resilient planning of summer operations by the low-cost 
carrier, which compromised its ability to adapt to minor disruptions (El País, 2016). 
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning the threat of terrorism, which has also affected airports 
directly. According to the Global Terrorism Database compiled by START (2016), 75 
terrorist attacks specifically targeted European airports between 1970 and 2015, 83% of 
which were bombings/explosions. Twenty-eight of these airport attacks (37.3%) occurred 
during the summer months. The most affected airports are located in the UK (primarily 
London and Belfast), France (Paris), Italy (Rome), Spain (Madrid), and Turkey (Istanbul), 
which together accounted for 39 attacks (52% of the attacks in the last 45 years). This trend 
continued during the first nine months of 2016, when two major attacks in Europe occurred. 
The bombing of a passenger terminal at Brussels International Airport on March 22nd led to a 
full closure for passenger flights that lasted for 12 days, affecting many tourists, after which 
the airport opened on a limited basis (CNN, 2016). Istanbul Ataturk Airport was the target of 
a very similar bombing attack on the evening of June 28th. However, in this case, the airport 
closed only overnight and was operating by the next morning (NYT, 2016). Terrorist attacks 
at non-European airports can also affect European holiday travelers. For example, the 
presumed bombing of a Russian flight departing from Sharm el-Sheikh Airport (Egypt) in 
November 2015 led to many flight cancellations due to increased security measures that left 
more than a thousand UK tourists stranded (BBC, 2015b) and caused substantial immediate 
damage to the tourism industry in the city (Colliers, 2016). In the future, the predicted rates 
of growth in air transport demand (ICAO, 2013) and the current geopolitical instability in 
regions that attract substantial tourism activity (e.g., the Mediterranean) could reduce the 
ability to cope with such disturbances and put additional pressure on airport and airline 
managers as well as public authorities in tourist destinations. 
The existing tourism literature (see, e.g., Mair et al., 2016) provides little insight into the role 
of air transportation agents in crisis management at tourism destinations, particularly 
regarding the recovery of departing tourists stranded due to massive flight cancellations. 
Previous studies in a broader tourism context, however, have established the negative impact 
of large-scale disruptions on destination image. The impact is particularly severe if it 
generates negative word-of-mouth (Lehto et al., 2008), if the tourists are relatively close to 
the source of the disruption (Walters and Clulow, 2010), and if there is some attribution of 
responsibility by the tourists to a local authority or organization (Breitsohl and Garrod, 2016). 
We argue that these characteristics are present in disruptive events that directly involve air 
transport services. Therefore, the issue of passenger recovery at tourism-oriented airports is 
bound to be relevant not only from a purely service-recovery perspective (airports and 
airlines) but also from the perspective of protecting the destination image (tourism 
authorities). The literature also highlights the importance of planning and preparedness for 
improving the outcome of crisis management strategies in tourism destinations (Ritchie, 
2008), bringing the concepts of resilience, speed of recovery, and cooperation into play (Scott 
and Laws, 2008). At this point, however, the tourism literature becomes mainly qualitative 
and discursive, with some authors (e.g., Mair et al., 2016) recommending the production of 
more quantitative research.  
To that end, it is worth mentioning that there is a decent body of transport literature on the 
structure of airline networks and their implications in terms of resilience to airport failures or 
the closure of air corridors (Lordan et al., 2014a). Building on these papers, we seek the 
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opportunity to adapt a quantitative transport methodology to the subject of tourism. To the 
best of our knowledge, there is no quantitative study that focuses on passenger service 
recovery at tourism-oriented airports in the transport or tourism literatures. We argue that this 
type of airport presents a set of characteristics that warrant differentiated treatment, such as a 
focus on origin-destination traffic, the prevalence of insular or otherwise isolated locations, 
strong seasonality (Dobruszkes, 2013), or the dominance of LCCs. These carriers have a 
strong focus on cost-cutting measures (Doganis, 2006), and their service failures typically 
result in more complaints in comparison to full-service carriers (Bamford and Xystouri, 2005; 
Dobruszkes, 2006). These characteristics can hamper the ability of tourism-oriented airports 
to relocate stranded passengers in the event of a major disruption and, therefore, should be 
analyzed within a context of tourism crisis management, alongside any policies aimed to 
improve the speed of recovery, including the issue of multi-party cooperation highlighted in 
the literature.  
We observe a disconnection between the analyses provided by the transport literature and the 
actual impact of airline or airport disruptions on the final users (i.e., the passengers/tourists 
who experience travel delays). Only a few of the available studies on air transport 
vulnerability and resilience consider the important aspect of how airlines relocate disrupted 
passengers, and to the best of our knowledge, no paper has taken into account the full 
passenger itineraries by employing air passenger demand data, as we do in this paper. 
Knowing the original passenger itineraries allows us to simulate an airline recovery process 
(i.e., rescheduling the stranded passengers) in the event of an airport closure. The use of 
demand data also allows us to disaggregate the impact across geographical markets, which is 
also a novel contribution to the literature. The relevance of this disaggregation can be 
understood by contrasting the literature on airline service recovery — which establishes the 
importance of “fairness” in that process (Akamavi et al., 2015; Nibkin et al., 2015) — with 
the experience of UK passengers stranded at Sharm el-Sheikh Airport in November 2015. 
These passengers faced longer delays than holidaymakers from other countries. While these 
differences were linked to increased security measures from UK authorities, it illustrates a 
situation in which a perceived “unfairness” in service recovery leads to passenger 
dissatisfaction (The Guardian, 2015) and negative impacts for the airline and the local 
tourism industry.  
In this context, the objective of the present paper is to analyze the ability of tourism-oriented 
airports to relocate departing passengers in the event of an unexpected airport closure. A case 
study of Palma de Mallorca Airport (PMI), the busiest tourism-oriented island airport in 
Europe, is presented. PMI is chosen due to its large number of passenger departures and the 
lack of alternative modes of transportation in the event on an airport closure. Moreover, the 
case study provides enough variability on airline types and geographical markets for a more 
detailed discussion of the results. Using an MIDT dataset on passenger itineraries that 
includes flights in August 2014, several closure scenarios are simulated, and disrupted 
passengers are sequentially relocated to minimum-delay itineraries where seat capacity is 
available. Average departure delays and non-relocation rates are used, along with other 
indicators, to assess the damage caused by each closure scenario, with a particular focus on 
the impact on UK and Germany markets. An econometric regression reveals the existence of 
airline and market-specific effects on the quality of passenger relocation at Palma de 
Mallorca International Airport. The analysis of the results focuses on the development of 
policies aimed at minimizing the impact on stranded tourists, such as allowing for passenger 
connections, establishing a protocol for interline cooperation, or improving intermodal 
access. All these measures are expected to play a role in mitigating the impact of the airport 
closure on airline loyalty and the destination image of the affected country or region. 
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes the European 
regulations on passengers’ rights in the event of cancellations and delays. Section 3 provides 
a literature review on all subjects relevant to this paper and discusses our contribution. 
Section 4 introduces the case study and describes the dataset and methodology. Section 5 
presents the results and discusses their main implications. Finally, Section 6 summarizes our 
findings, addresses the limitations of our model, and proposes new paths for future research. 
2. REGULATORY BACKGROUND 
European regulations — i.e., European Commission (EC) No. 261/2004 — grant airline 
passengers a number of rights in the event of flight cancellation or delay (see EC, 2008). 
These include the rights of care, rerouting, reimbursement, and compensation. The 
regulations recognize three different thresholds of departure delay, depending on the travel 
distance, that trigger a duty of care by the airline. Type 1 trips are those under 1,500 km, for 
which the threshold is two hours; type 2 trips are those between 1,500 km and 3,500 km (and 
all remaining intra-EU flights), for which the threshold is three hours; and type 3 trips are the 
remaining ones (longer than 3,500 km), for which the threshold is four hours. This 
classification refers to the great circle distance between the affected passenger’s location 
(e.g., point of departure of the cancelled flight) and the last destination at which the 
cancellation will delay the passenger’s scheduled arrival. Airlines should provide passengers 
with meals and refreshments, hotel accommodations (when overnight stays are needed), 
airport transfers, and appropriate means of communication (e.g., phone, email, and/or fax). 
Delays longer than five hours also allow passengers to cancel their reservation and be 
reimbursed in full “for the parts of the journey not made, and for the parts already made if the 
flight is no longer serving any purpose in relation to the passenger’s original travel plan”. The 
duty of care of an air carrier stops when the reservation is cancelled. 
In the event of a flight cancellation, passengers are entitled to all of the above, but they can 
also be offered a new travel itinerary (rerouting) — under “comparable transport conditions” 
— to their final destination “at the earliest convenience” and “subject to availability of seats”. 
According to the EC, “re-routing does not necessarily need to be operated by the airline the 
passenger booked with”, and “re-routing alternatives can be proposed by other means of 
transport, such as train, taxi or bus, if the distance to be covered is appropriate for such 
transport modes” (EC, 2008). Finally, passengers on cancelled flights are also entitled to 
compensation under certain conditions, such as when the cancellation is not caused by 
extraordinary circumstances beyond the airline’s control (e.g., safety and security, weather, 
industrial actions, or airport facilities). The airline is not liable to pay compensation when 1) 
passengers are given notice more than two weeks before their flight or 2) they are given 
notice between two weeks and seven days before their flight and offered rerouting that 
departs no more than two hours before, and arrives no less than four hours after, the original 
flight (one hour before and two hours after if less than a week’s notice is given). The amount 
of compensation is EUR 250, EUR 400, and EUR 600 for type 1, type 2, and type 3 trips, 
respectively, as defined above. These amounts are reduced by 50% if the airline offers a 
suitable rerouting with a maximum arrival delay for type 1, type 2, and type 3 trips, 
analogous to the ones at the beginning of this section.  
3. LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONTRIBUTION 
Our contribution is thematically framed within the tourism literature, particularly in the areas 
of post-crisis recovery and destination image. From a methodological perspective, however, it 
builds on concepts from the transport literature, particularly papers that analyze the resilience 
of transport networks, upon which we develop a new methodology to measure passenger 
delays and relocation rates and to identify airline- and market-specific effects.  
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3.1 Tourism literature 
A recent survey of the published research on post-crisis recovery strategies for tourist 
destinations (Mair et al., 2016) does not feature any research with a primary focus on the role 
of transportation agents, airports, or airlines in that process. This is at odds with the definition 
of a tourism product (Gunn, 1998) as a complex experience where tourists use multiple 
services during the course of their visit (including transportation, accommodation, and 
attraction services). The role of transportation services as a factor in the creation a 
“destination product” has been empirically established since Mo et al. (1993), while the 
impact of transportation infrastructure on international tourism growth has also been 
established by studies such as Khadaroo and Seetanah (2008). In that regard, it is common for 
airport managers to refer to the key role of airports as visitors’ first and last impressions of a 
particular city or country (Heathrow Airport, 2014). Several studies also note the close link 
between airport service quality and destination image, as services such as check-in (Rendeiro, 
2006) or food and beverage (Del Chiappa et al., 2016) are an integral part of the tourism 
experience. Therefore, we conclude that the key role that transportation agents, including 
airports and airlines, must play in crisis recovery at tourist destinations has been neglected by 
the tourism crisis management literature. 
The relevance of this gap is accentuated by the fact that the same literature indicates several 
factors that are harmful to destination image and are present in disruptive events involving air 
transport. First, a link between the destination image and brand image of the organizations 
and businesses involved is established by Niininen and Gatsou (2008). In this regard, Lehto et 
al. (2008) document the damage to the destination image after the 2004 Indian Ocean 
Tsunami caused by negative word-of-mouth about seaside destinations in the affected areas. 
Arguably, this process applies to air transport disruptions: The generation of word-of-mouth 
is a typical outcome of airline service recovery interactions, as indicated by Weber and 
Sparks (2004). Any negative impact on the airline’s brand image can also have an impact on 
the image of the affected destination. This effect is potentiated in the case of airport service 
recovery interactions because the name of the airport typically includes the name of the city 
where the disruption took place. The second factor is the concept of proximity, explored by 
Walters and Clulow (2010), which has been shown to affect tourists’ perceptions of a 
disruptive event. In the case of air transport disruptions, this “proximity” is inferred from the 
role of tourists as the users of the service that has been suspended, who now depend on the 
recovery of the service for the provision of their basic needs (i.e., food and accommodation). 
Third, Breitsohl and Garrod (2016) reflect on the concepts of severity and responsibility 
attribution in a destination image context, with a focus on i) the amount of damage generated 
by the disruptive event, ii) the cognitive association of the cause of an incident with a 
particular entity, and iii) the perceived likelihood of that entity experiencing any negative 
effects from its disrupting decision. The stronger these three effects, the greater the damage to 
the destination image. The connection to air transport is supported by the airline service 
recovery literature, which has established the link between the “controllability” of a 
disruption event and passenger trust and loyalty towards an airline. Controllability refers to 
customers’ evaluation of whether the cause of the failure was uncontrollable or controllable 
by the service provider (Nibkin et al., 2015). Again, we submit that this effect is present in air 
transport disruptions, particularly those associated with large-scale industrial actions, such as 
ATC strikes. Thus, by focusing on air transport disruptions, our contribution is relevant at the 
first level from the perspective of destination image recovery. 
At the second level, we also contribute to the literature on tourism service recovery, which 
already includes a few papers focusing on airline passengers (see, e.g., Cheng et al., 2008; 
Lindenmeier and Tscheulin, 2008; Akamavi et al., 2015; and Nibkin et al., 2015). A recurring 
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theme in these publications is the idea of “fairness”, linked to both i) the perception of 
whether the extent of the recovery effort is sufficient to compensate passengers for their 
trouble and ii) the perception that the airline prioritized ethical principles, rather than profit 
maximization, in its recovery decision-making process. Fairness is identified as a key driver 
of airport service quality by Wattanacharoensil et al. (2015). Furthermore, it is worth 
remembering that regardless of the cause of the disruption, passengers are always instructed 
to contact their respective airline. Therefore, even if the airlines are not directly responsible 
(e.g., weather, terrorism), a sentiment of “unfairness” towards the airlines can arise if 
passengers perceive that the commitment to and quality of recovery efforts are not in line 
with the extent of the damage caused to them. Whereas these previous studies are mainly 
based on questionnaire data on passenger perceptions, we are able to contribute to the airline 
service recovery literature in a different way, i.e., with a comparative analysis of the quality 
of passenger relocation across different airlines and geographical markets. The airline 
dimension of this analysis is highly relevant. The strong focus on cost-cutting measures from 
LCCs (Doganis, 2006) can drive feelings of unfairness among stranded passengers, 
particularly in comparison with the recovery service offered by full-service airlines. The 
country-level dimension of this analysis is also a novel contribution, motivated by the 
November 2015 experience of UK passengers at Sharm el-Sheikh Airport and their 
differentiated treatment in comparison with passengers departing to other countries.  
Finally, the tourism literature also highlights the importance of planning and preparedness in 
improving the outcome of crisis management strategies (Ritchie, 2008), bringing the concepts 
of “resilience” and speed of recovery into play (Scott and Laws, 2008),as well as the need for 
multi-party cooperation in resilience planning (Xu and Grunewald, 2009). None of these 
topics has been covered in a case study on a tourism-oriented airport. Authors such as Ciocco 
and Michael (2007) note the difficulties that individual operators face in rebuilding their 
market shares in the absence of mutual collaboration. This issue is bound to be relevant in 
relation to LCC service recovery at tourist airports because these types of airlines are not 
typically part of an alliance and thus do not have immediate airline partners to reach in the 
event of a disruption.  
The tourism literature becomes mainly discursive in relation to these topics, with Mair et al. 
(2016) recommending the production of more quantitative research. To that end, we aim to 
develop a quantitative model to measure the effectiveness of several strategies at the time of 
improving the speed of recovery and minimizing the impact on stranded tourists in the event 
of an airport closure. Based on the conclusions of the crisis management and service recovery 
literature, we will address the issues of airline cooperation and fairness by comparing the 
outcomes (in terms of travel delays and rates of relocation) of the airline recovery process 
under different cooperation scenarios and across airlines and geographical markets. 
3.2 Transport literature 
The literature on transport resilience and vulnerability offers a relevant body of knowledge to 
operationalize the measurements needed to achieve the contributions stated in the previous 
section. Rose (2007) defines resilience as the ability of a system to maintain functionality 
when disrupted, with a particular focus on the speed at which the system returns to normal. 
Vulnerability is defined by Berdica (2002) as the “susceptibility of a system to experience 
disruptions that can affect its functionality”. When referring to a transportation network, 
functionality is commonly related to the possibility of using any node or link of the network 
during a given period (Jenelius et al., 2006). Authors such as Berdica (2002) and D’Este and 
Taylor (2003) argue that measuring the magnitude of the consequences associated with a 
service disruption should be the primary focus of vulnerability studies. 
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Mattsson and Jenelius (2015) describe two main approaches to measuring the vulnerability of 
transport networks: a) topological vulnerability and b) system-based vulnerability. In the 
topological vulnerability approach, the network is represented as an abstract graph, and the 
system damage is measured by the changes in network topology after a disruption affects one 
or more nodes or links. This approach uses only supply data on available infrastructure and 
service frequencies. In the system-based vulnerability approach, the network graph is 
complemented with information on actual or predicted traffic flows, and the interaction 
between supply and demand under disruptions is modelled, for example, with a user rerouting 
algorithm. Examples of this system-based approach are found in Jenelius et al. (2006), De los 
Santos et al. (2012), or Rodríguez-Núñez and García-Palomares (2014), where road and rail 
network vulnerability under a variety of disrupting scenarios is measured by the total delays 
experienced by users, who need to alter their original itineraries, and by the amount of 
unsatisfied demand. This second approach is the one we prefer for our case study. The reason 
is that it allows us to obtain a more detailed measurement of the consequences for stranded 
tourists in the event of an airport closure, to evaluate the performance of airlines in meeting 
the regulatory requirements of rerouting passengers in “comparable transport conditions” and 
to discuss the potential costs they incur. 
Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in measuring the damage caused by the 
removal of nodes (i.e., airport closures) and/or links (i.e., air corridors) to determine the 
vulnerability of an air transport network to these events. The purely topological approach to 
assessing this damage does not explicitly take into account the need to redistribute the 
disrupted traffic. Nonetheless, many interesting conclusions can be obtained. Lordan et al. 
(2014b) model the global airport network and develop a measure of the damage produced by 
both random failures and targeted attacks based on the number of disconnected airports that 
result from them. Janic (2015) also relies on disconnected flights as a measure of network 
damage and concludes that larger airports (i.e., Atlanta in the case of 2012 Hurricane Sandy) 
tend to be the most critical. Lordan et al. (2015) analyze the resilience of the global airline 
alliance networks. They conclude that Star Alliance is the most resilient because its network 
has a more balanced distribution of important airports, in contrast with the dominance of few 
large hubs in the networks of Oneworld and SkyTeam. Finally, Lordan et al. (2016) examine 
the topological resilience of individual airline networks, establishing that the point-to-point 
flight networks of LCCs are more robust than the hub-and-spoke structures of traditional 
carriers. This is aligned with the established notion that as network concentration around 
pivotal nodes increases, so does the network’s vulnerability, mainly because of the lack of 
structural redundancies that support the recovery of traffic flows via alternative routings 
(Zhang et al., 2015). 
A system-based approach to assessing network vulnerability incorporates information on 
passenger flows to simulate how passengers are relocated after a disruption. The costs of 
airline disruptions for airlines and passengers have been measured by many studies that 
employ both monetary and non-monetary indicators (e.g., Schavell, 2000; Allan et al., 2001; 
Schaefer and Millner, 2001; Janic, 2005; Kohl et al., 2007; Janic, 2015). The most common 
non-monetary cost measures are the number of passengers affected (missed connections and 
cancellations), the proportion of those successfully relocated within a recovery window, and 
the total delay experienced, measured by the difference between the original and rescheduled 
itineraries (Bratu and Barnhart, 2006). We implement these measures of passenger disruption 
into our case study. 
In simulating the airline recovery process, there is a need to replicate the challenges arising 
from irregular airline operations, with a particular focus on the recovery of aircraft, crews, 
and passengers in an optimal (i.e., cost-minimizing) fashion. The operating carrier typically 
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takes responsibility for this process on the day of the disruption. As noted by Barnhart 
(2009), there are a number of strategies that airlines use to that end, including delaying and 
cancelling flights, reassigning aircraft or crews to different routes, and relocating disrupted 
passengers. These adjustments are subject to a number of restrictions, including crew work 
rules, maintenance schedules, aircraft and passenger positioning, and the inherent competitive 
pressures from other airlines operating at the same airport, to which dissatisfied passengers 
may switch. Thus, one can argue that robust operations can be a source of competitive 
advantage for airlines. However, the operating carrier may collaborate with other airlines 
during the recovery. If a ticket is sold as a codeshare, the disruption procedures are carried 
out through a specific annex within the agreement. Other procedures are carried out through 
agreements linked to alliance membership. According to EC (2007), most airlines will reach 
out to help a customer of another member airline if necessary. The importance of interline 
cooperation in improving the quality of airline recovery is noted by authors such as Wang 
(2007) — who looks at the effects of shared airline capacity on reducing passenger delay — 
and by organizations such as AIAA (2015). 
There is a decent body of operations research literature devoted to providing efficient 
methods to solve these optimization problems under different scenarios (e.g., Yan and Lin, 
1997; Lettovsky et al., 2000; Abdelghany et al. 2008; Bratu and Barnhart, 2006; Petersen et 
al., 2012, and Maher, 2015). However, Kohl et al. (2007) note the lack of studies featuring 
interline cooperation for passenger recovery. The available works address single-airline cases 
(in isolation from larger-scale air transport networks) and aim to achieve minimum execution 
times for different flight cancellation scenarios. By focusing exclusively on passenger 
recovery, we are able to adapt the optimization techniques to an entire airport closure, 
involving many affected airlines that may interact with one another. Furthermore, passenger 
relocation occurs within the context of a large-scale air transport network, in interaction with 
airlines, airports, and markets not initially affected by the closure.  
Few papers on air transport resilience and vulnerability have modelled passenger recovery in 
this fashion. However, none of these studies use detailed demand data, and therefore, their 
rescheduling simulations do not take into account the original passenger itineraries. This is 
the methodological gap that we aim to cover. Cardillo et al. (2013), working with the 
European network, develop a passenger rescheduling algorithm and determine the change in 
network topology after simulating random failures. They define a multi-layered network, 
with each layer representing an individual airline’s flight network. To make the rescheduling 
more realistic, passenger recovery options within the same layer are given priority. The 
results show that the definition of a multi-layered structure increases network damage as it 
restricts the options for passenger relocation. This methodological choice is relevant for our 
research purposes because it provides a clear way to implement different scenarios depending 
on the degree of interline cooperation. Also relevant is the paper by Hossain et al. (2013) on 
Australian airports, where variables such as airport capacity and ground transfers are included 
in the rescheduling algorithm. They find that the impact of a closure can be mitigated by 
having close surrogate airports to serve stranded passengers.  
These conclusions also serve to highlight the challenging nature of air transport disruptions at 
tourism-oriented airports in comparison with other airports. First, tourism-oriented airports 
tend to experience strong seasonality (Dobruszkes, 2006), which challenges the ability of 
tourism businesses to plan and manage their labor and capital resources efficiently (Ruggieri, 
2015). We submit that this argument also extends to the planning and management of 
resources needed to ensure resilient transport operations during peak periods. The reason is 
that seasonal traffic patterns affect airports’ financial performance (Graham, 2013) and force 
managerial decisions into survival mode during off-peak periods (Eurocontrol, 2007). These 
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difficulties persist even after medium-term activity forecasts became more reliable when 
traditional “holiday” charter airlines move to scheduled operations (De Wit and Zuidberg, 
2016).  
Table 1 identifies the most seasonal airports (highest ratio between August and February seat 
capacity in 2014) among the top-100 busiest airports in the European Economic Area. 
Inspecting this table, we can identify a second characteristic of tourism-oriented airports: they 
primarily handle origin-destination (OD) traffic (Dobruszkes, 2006). This means that 
passengers either initiate or terminate their journey at the airport. Therefore, they have a 
reduced set of transportation alternatives in the event of a closure in comparison with 
connecting passengers, for whom alternative intermediate hubs may be available. Third, there 
is a substantial number of tourist airports serving island destinations (for example, in the 
Mediterranean region). While larger islands can indeed be served by more than one airport, 
insularity adds to the aforementioned restrictions for passenger relocation by limiting the 
access to immediate road or rail transportation alternatives for international travel. Fourth, 
tourist airports are typically dominated by LCCs (Rey et al., 2011), which have different 
network structures than traditional, full-service carriers1 (Dobruszkes, 2013). On one hand, 
Lordan et al. (2016) does establish that the point-to-point flight network of LCCs is more 
robust, from a topological perspective, than the hub-and-spoke structures of traditional 
carriers. On the other hand, one must not forget that only a few LCCs belong to airline 
alliances, which effectively restricts their ability to relocate disrupted passengers in seats 
offered by partner airlines in the event of an airport closure. The conclusions of Cardillo et al. 
(2013) suggest that LCCs offer a worse quality of relocation by being restricted to their own 
flight networks when searching for relocation alternatives. We aim to investigate this in a 
context of evaluating “fairness” in service recovery across different airline types. 
Table 1. Most seasonal airports among the top-100 busiest airports in the EEA (August 2014) 
Airport 
code 
Airport 
name 
Country Seasonality 
factor 
low-cost/unallied  
seat capacity % 
OD passengers 
% 
Island 
destination 
CFU Corfu Greece 23.8 85.3% 97.8% Yes 
SPU Split Croatia 13.1 52.0% 98.6% No 
IBZ Ibiza Spain 10.7 82.3% 97.4% Yes 
RHO Rhodes Greece 9.7 74.2% 98.4% Yes 
HER Irakleion Greece 9.3 66.4% 98.5% Yes 
OLB Olbia Italy 8.3 90.1% 97.2% Yes* 
MAH Menorca Spain 7.8 87.2% 98.6% Yes 
PMI Palma de Mallorca Spain 4.8 80.5% 95.5% Yes 
FAO Faro Portugal 4.5 84.7% 99.8% No 
EMA East Midlands UK 2.9 100.0% 99.6% No 
LBA Leeds Bradford UK 2.7 91.5% 99.8% No 
KEF Keflavik International Iceland 2.6 91.7% 69.5% Yes* 
LCA Larnaca Cyprus 2.5 68.4% 98.0% Yes* 
AGP Malaga Spain 2.4 75.9% 99.4% No 
ALC Alicante Spain 2.2 86.0% 99.2% No 
CAG Cagliari Italy 2.2 63.8% 98.9% Yes* 
SKG Thessaloniki Greece 2.1 48.7% 94.8% No 
PSA Pisa Italy 2.1 78.4% 99.0% No 
MLA Malta Malta 2.0 86.3% 96.3% Yes 
ATH Athens Greece 2.0 22.0% 82.6% No 
Note: Seasonality factor is calculated as the ratio of seat capacity of August over February 2014. An asterisk denotes an island airport that 
is not the only airport in the island (e.g. Corsica, Cyprus, or Tenerife have more than one airport). Source: OAG, Own elaboration. 
In summary, this review of the transport literature supports the existence of a methodological 
gap related to the use of demand data to simulate multiple-airline recovery in the event of 
major disruptions. Existing papers, however, refer to the types of passenger impacts to be 
measured (delays and relocation rates) and give clues on how to implement airline 
                                                 
1 Some LCCs, such as Air Berlin or Vueling, have developed a “hybrid” strategy, allowing passenger 
connections at their main bases at Palma de Mallorca and Barcelona (Burghouwt, 2016). This type of traffic, 
however, is secondary to the main OD business of LCCs. 
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cooperation in the model. In addition, the available evidence on air transport resilience 
supports the definition of tourism-oriented airports as a differentiated case study.  
4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 A case study of Palma de Mallorca airport 
Palma de Mallorca Airport (IATA code: PMI) is the main airport serving the Balearic island 
of Mallorca (Spain), located in the Mediterranean. It is owned and operated by AENA 
(Spanish Airports and Airspace), which also operates most commercial airports in Spain. In 
August 2014, approximately 96% of passengers who passed through the airport either 
originated or terminated their journeys there. Therefore, PMI can be defined as mainly an 
origin-destination (OD) airport. For the purposes of this paper, however, we focus only on 
passenger departures. This airport (at its peak level of operation in August) is deemed a 
suitable case study as it meets the criteria stated in the introduction. First, as an island airport, 
disrupted departing passengers do not have access to alternative modes of transportation, 
such as rail or road, to reach their destinations. In addition, there is limited access to surrogate 
airports. The closest commercial airports are located on the islands of Ibiza and Menorca, 
both of which require a ferry transfer that exceeds 5 hours in duration. This makes departing 
passengers at PMI particularly vulnerable to airport closures in terms of potential travel 
delays. The airport is no stranger to these events. In July 2009, PMI remained closed for two 
hours after a terrorist attack in the island (to prevent the perpetrators from fleeing), which led 
to the disruption of 47 flights. AENA reinforced ATC services and coordinated with airlines 
and baggage handling companies to ensure a swift recovery (El País, 2009). In December 
2010, airport operations at PMI were stopped for two days because of the nationwide ATC 
strike (El País, 2010). Many recovery measures were implemented: The government 
militarized ATC services to force controllers back into their posts. The airport operator 
advised departing passengers not to go to the airport until further notice to facilitate terminal 
operations. During the closure, ferry companies reinforced their services, as they became the 
only means of travel out of the island. Airlines had limited maneuverability and, only after 
flights resumed, Iberia deployed larger aircraft to PMI routes to increase its capacity for 
relocated passengers (Rtve, 2010). On a smaller scale, these disruptions have continued to 
occur due to frequent industrial actions across Europe. For example, 28 flights were cancelled 
at PMI because of the French ATC strike during Easter 2016 (Diario de Mallorca, 2016). 
Second, PMI is a tourism-oriented airport with strong seasonal traffic. During the summer 
months, PMI becomes one of the busiest airports in Europe (Figure 1), due to the large 
number of visitors to the island. As a major inbound tourist market, most passenger 
departures at PMI are tourists returning their countries of residence after their holidays. This 
limits the ability of disrupted passengers to decide not to fly in the event of a cancellation and 
places great pressure on the airport and airlines to attend to the welfare of passengers until 
they are assigned an alternative itinerary. PMI’s strong dependence on tourism translates into 
seasonal traffic flows. As observed in Figure 2, traffic during the peak month of August is 
between four and five times higher than it is during the off-peak months in the winter. This 
unevenness in monthly traffic is bound to challenge the ability of airlines and airports to plan 
and invest in measures to improve the resilience of air transport operations.   
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Figure 1 (left). Top-20 European airports by monthly departures (August 2014) 
Figure 2 (right). Monthly distribution of flights at PMI airport (2014) 
Source: OAG 
Third, while the airport is dominated by LCCs, we observe a diversity of business models, 
ranging from unallied no-frills carriers (Ryanair) to allied hybrid carriers (e.g., Air Berlin, a 
member of Oneworld). There is also a good representation of “holiday” airlines (e.g., Thomas 
Cook, Monarch) and even a small presence of traditional, full-service airlines (such as British 
Airways or Lufthansa). This allows a comparative analysis of the potential for passenger 
recovery between airline types. An additional depth of analysis is provided by focusing on 
the German and UK markets, which are the largest international markets served by the airport 
and account for 57% of departures during the sample month (Table 2). Table 3 provides 
disaggregated information on the top destinations and airlines in both markets according to 
the number of weekly departures. The largest carrier is Air Berlin, which operated more than 
400 flights per week from PMI to German destinations in August 2014. In the UK market, the 
top carriers were Ryanair and EasyJet, which also serve the German market. 
Table 2. Top-10 European markets departing from PMI (August 2014) 
Country % OD passengers 
over airport total 
% indirect passengers 
in country market 
1. Germany 37.0% 1.0% 
2. UK 20.3% 0.6% 
3. Switzerland 3.8% 1.6% 
4. France 2.2% 6.0% 
5. Netherlands 1.8% 2.2% 
6. Austria 1.6% 2.5% 
7. Belgium 1.5% 0.7% 
8. Italy 1.5% 12.9% 
9. Denmark 1.2% 4.3% 
10. Sweden 1.0% 20.1% 
Source: OAG 
Table 3. Top-10 airlines and destinations in Germany and UK markets served by PMI (August 2014) 
Germany market   UK market 
Airline Weekly 
Departures 
  Destination Weekly 
Departures 
  Airline Weekly 
Departures 
  Destination Weekly 
Departures 
Air Berlin 407 
 
Dusseldorf 96 
 
Easyjet 126 
 
London Gatwick 62 
Germanwings 109 
 
Koln/Bonn 81 
 
Ryanair 87 
 
Manchester 58 
Condor 72 
 
Stuttgart 67 
 
Jet2.com 73 
 
East Midlands 34 
TUIfly 57 
 
Frankfurt 64 
 
Monarch 62 
 
Birmingham 32 
Ryanair 52 
 
Hamburg 62 
 
Thomas Cook 40 
 
Stansted 29 
Lufthansa 25 
 
Munich 62 
 
British Airways 15 
 
London Luton 28 
Easyjet 16 
 
Berlin Tegel 50 
 
Flybe 12 
 
Bristol 24 
Germania 14 
 
Hannover 40 
 
Thomson 8 
 
Leeds-Bradford 24 
Vueling  7 
 
Bremen 27 
 
Condor 5 
 
Newcastle 23 
Jetairfly 1   Nuremberg 27  Norwegian 3   Liverpool 20 
Source: OAG 
Our empirical analysis is based on the traffic of an average Monday at PMI. The hourly 
distribution of flights is shown in Figure 3. This chart reveals three distinct waves of activity 
throughout the day: the morning wave, from 8:00 to 13:00 (peak traffic 10:00-12:00); the 
afternoon wave, from 13:00 to 19:00 (peak traffic 14:00-16:00); and the evening wave, from 
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19:00 to 24:00 (peak traffic 22:00-24:00)2. This is used to define the closure scenarios. A 
scenario is defined by a combination of closure times and recovery constraints. All 19 
scenarios included in this case study are shown in Table 4. In regards to the temporal scope, 
we include three short 2-hour closures that coincide with the peaks of activity shown in 
Figure 3; three medium-length closures for each of the daily traffic waves; and one full-day 
closure. In all instances, a recovery window of 48 hours is set, i.e., disrupted passengers can 
be relocated in alternative itineraries within a window of 48 hours after the closure ends. The 
implementation of a 48-hour recovery window (which is the computational limit to our depth 
of search for alternative itineraries) implies the assumption that passengers always accept a 
rerouting within the first 48 hours (instead of deciding not to travel). The choice of case study 
supports this simplification. The large cohort of inbound holiday passengers stranded at our 
insular airport will be less likely to reject a rerouting if offered one. The recent case of 
Sharm-el-Sheikh, with UK holidaymakers waiting for days, confirms that view. This fixed 
recovery window also preserves comparability across scenarios with different closure 
periods. In addition to looking at the total number of relocated passengers, the effectiveness 
of each scenario is measured by the average departure delays per passenger and other 
indicators linked to airline costs. Each scenario also sets the constraints that will guide the 
search for alternative itineraries. The most restrictive scenarios allow airlines to relocate only 
passengers with direct (non-stop) itineraries, within their own airline/alliance/partnership 
flight networks, and with seat capacity constraints. The least restrictive scenario allows both 
direct and indirect itineraries, across all airlines, and no seat capacity restrictions. The 
implementation of interline constraints to passenger recovery is based on the definition of a 
multi-layered air transport network, as suggested by Cardillo et al. (2013). 
 
Figure 3. Hourly distribution of flights at PMI airport (average Monday August 2014) 
Source: OAG 
Table 4. Recovery scenarios 
beginning 
closure –
Monday 
(UTC+2) 
end 
closure – 
Monday 
(UTC+2) 
48h recovery window 48h recovery window 48h recovery window 48h recovery window 
direct flights only direct and indirect direct and indirect direct and indirect 
own recovery own recovery interline recovery interline recovery 
capacity restrictions capacity restrictions capacity restrictions no capacity restrictions 
10:00 12:00  scenario 1 scenario 2 
  15:00 17:00 scenario 3 scenario 4 
  22:00 24:00 scenario 5 scenario 6     
08:00 13:00 scenario 7 scenario 8 scenario 9 
 13:00 19:00 scenario 10 scenario 11 scenario 12 
 19:00 24:00 scenario 13 scenario 14 scenario 15   
08:00 24:00 scenario 16 scenario 17 scenario 18 scenario 19 
 
The methodological process can be summarized as follows. First, a baseline travel dataset is 
generated by assigning flight numbers and travel times to passenger itineraries. Second, we 
                                                 
2 All times are local (UTC+2). 
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simulate each of the 19 closure scenarios, and the affected passengers are sequentially 
relocated in delay-minimizing itineraries that meet the scenario’s constraints. Third, the 
impact of each closure is measured by several disruption indicators. Finally, a set of 
econometric regressions determines whether the quality of relocation differs across markets 
and airlines for selected scenarios.    
4.2 Datasets 
The proposed method combines worldwide supply (schedules and seats) and demand data 
(passenger itineraries). It is worth noting that the geographical scope of these datasets 
exceeds the destination map of PMI. This is done to reflect the seat capacity available in the 
European air transport system to accommodate the disrupted passengers at PMI. The supply 
side is covered by a dataset of worldwide flight schedules during the first week of August 
2014, obtained from OAG Schedules. Each record indicates the operating airline, alliance 
membership (if applicable), flight number, origin and destination airport codes, number of 
seats, flight distance, departure time, and arrival times. The demand side is covered by an 
MIDT dataset for the first week of August 2014, which includes all passenger itineraries 
involving at least one European airport as origin, destination, or intermediate hub. Each 
record contains information on the ticketing airline and indicates the points of origin and 
destination, the connecting airports (up to two intermediate stops), and the number of 
passengers. The original sources of information for the MIDT dataset are Global 
Distributions Systems (GDSs) such as Galileo, Sabre, and Amadeus, among others. These 
raw data are processed by our data provider, OAG. Previous studies have used these datasets 
for the analysis of airport connectivity (Suau-Sánchez et al., 2014, 2015).  
The proposed method requires three additional datasets: 1) a full list of alliance, codeshare, 
and interline partners for each published airline in the MIDT file. This information is 
obtained both from OAG and the airlines’ websites; 2) airport-specific minimum connecting 
times, including approximately 68,000 airline-specific exceptions. This is obtained from the 
OAG Connections Analyser; and 3) minimum ground transfer times between the 50 largest 
airports in the European network and their potential surrogates. The surrogates are defined as 
airports located less than 130 min from a given airport in an uncongested road/rail transfer. 
This threshold represents the corresponding road/rail transfer time associated with the 
shortest flights in the schedule dataset. The travel times are easily obtained using Google 
Maps.  
4.3 Creating the baseline travel dataset  
Although the MIDT dataset provides information on passenger itineraries, it does not indicate 
the actual flights taken by the passengers or their travel times. Therefore, for each MIDT 
record, a search is performed in the OAG file for all relevant flights that were operated by 
either the published airline or any of its partners during the sample week. If the itinerary 
involves more than one sector, flight connections are built on the following restrictions, 
adapted from Grosche (2009) and Seredyński et al. (2014): a) The published minimum 
connecting times must be met, b) the maximum connecting time is arbitrarily set at one hour 
above the shortest valid connection time, c) passengers on each first-leg flight always prefer 
the shortest travel time, and d) passengers on each final-leg flight also prefer the shortest 
travel times.  
Once the suitable flights (or flight combinations) are selected, the proportion of passengers 
allocated to each travel option is equal to the proportion of its seat capacity to the total 
capacity. After the first round of processing, the records in the baseline travel dataset are 
aggregated by flight number and departure date to check whether the number of passengers 
14 
 
assigned to each individual flight exceeds the seat capacity of the aircraft. Passengers over 
capacity are removed from the baseline travel dataset and brought into new rounds of 
processing with updated seat capacities. For this paper, three sequential rounds are enough to 
ensure that 95% of all passengers in the MIDT file are allocated. The average load factor for 
intra-European flights that results from this processing is 78.6%, which falls within the range 
of values reported for intra-European domestic and international markets by the Association 
of European Airlines (AEA, 2014) for August 2014 (78.3-81.5). The average travel times are 
144 minutes for the German markets and 161 for the UK markets out of PMI. The baseline 
travel dataset and the predicted load factors for all European flights are brought forward into 
the next stage. 
4.4 Airport closures and passenger rescheduling 
An airport closure is characterized by a vector including the airport code and the times of the 
beginning and end of the closure. All flights scheduled to depart from the closed airport are 
labelled as “OFF”. Of all remaining flights, those already at full capacity are labelled as 
“FULL”, and the rest are “ON”. Every disrupted demand record from the baseline travel 
dataset is compiled in a rescheduling matrix that indicates the number of passengers, the first 
flight in their itinerary to be rescheduled, and the final destination of their trip. This matrix is 
sorted by the original departure time to establish the sequence in which passengers will be 
relocated. Depending on the scenario, different passenger recovery options are considered: 1) 
relocation only in non-stop flights within the same airline, alliance, or partnership, 2) 
relocation via non-stop and indirect routes within the same airline, alliance, or partnership, 
and 3) unrestricted relocation (passengers can be relocated in suitable flights operated by all 
airlines). Only remaining “ON” flights can be used for passenger recovery, and all retain their 
original schedules. In addition, there is the possibility of transferring to other airports by 
ground transport with the objective to make flight connections or end the journey. This 
allows a disrupted passenger bound to a German destination to arrive at, for example, 
Frankfurt and take advantage of intermodal transport alternatives available at the airport 
terminal for medium- or long-distance rail travel. For simplicity, only road/rail travel times 
between airports in different cities are computed. 
Table 5. Algorithm for passenger rescheduling 
Inputs:       Time-directed distance matrix (TDM) containing origin and destination flights. 
                    Rescheduling matrix (RES) created from the disrupted records in the baseline travel dataset 
                    Matrix of flight schedules and load factors (MFS) 
Output:      Matrix with the new itineraries of the relocated passengers (REL). 
1: for each entry of RES do    
2:         lookup the disrupted flights in MFS     
3:         subtract disrupted passengers and check for changes in flight status (i.e. “FULL” to “ON”)    
4:         if status has changed then update TDM    
5:         while not all passengers are processed do    
6:                         SP ← shortest path in TDM between the original departure time in RES and the passenger final destination airport 
7:                         if SP algorithm does not converge then do 
8:                                discard passengers and lookup next entry in RES 
9:                         else 
10:                                create a new entry of REL 
11:                                for each flight segment in SP do    
12:                                      if capacity of the flight is exceeded then do    
13:                                           add the segment to the current entry of REL allocating as many passengers as possible 
14:                                           change the status of the segment in MFS to “FULL” and update TDM 
15:                                           relocate the remaining passengers in further iterations                                   
16:                                      else     
17:                                             add the segment to the current entry of REL allocating the disrupted passengers 
18:                                             if flight is full now then change the status of the segment in MFS to “FULL” and update TDM 
19:                                       end if    
20:                                  end for    
21:                         end if    
22:         end while    
23: end for    
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Once the scenario’s constraints are implemented, the search for alternative routings for 
passenger recovery is driven by the objective of delay minimization, as is common in 
empirical applications (Barnhart, 2009). In real-world recovery scenarios, airlines face many 
competing objectives in their attempt to minimize the costs of disruption. Some of these 
objectives may be at odds with delay minimization (Rupp et al., 2005)3. In support of the 
simple approach that we employ is the fact that we do not introduce aircraft or crew 
relocation into our algorithm, which would bring the cost implications of recovery decisions 
to the forefront. However, there is still an implicit cost pressure to minimize delays to cut 
down on assistance costs, reimbursements, and passenger disgruntlement. Furthermore, our 
approach is supported by the regulatory statement that rerouting should be offered “at the 
earliest convenience”.  
A shortest-path-length algorithm is applied on a time-distance matrix comprising all 
remaining origin and destination flight nodes. The rescheduling algorithm finds the optimal 
alternative routing for the disrupted passengers in a dynamic and iterative process (Table 5). 
Capacity constraints are taken into account: If there is no spare capacity to allocate all 
disrupted passengers in their new itinerary, the excess passengers are taken aside and 
relocated in the next iteration using an updated distance matrix that reflects the changes in 
capacity. Any passenger who remains unallocated at the end of the process is flagged as such. 
The calculation of shortest-path itineraries is performed using the iGraph library in R (Csardi 
and Nepusz, 2006). This employs the well-known Dijkstra algorithm, which performs an 
exhaustive search that ensures that, if anything, a shortest path is always returned. 
The impact of each closure is measured by the non-relocation rate (the proportion of 
passengers for whom an alternative itinerary was not found within the recovery window) and 
by the average departure delay experienced by the relocated passengers. Separate measures of 
impact are provided for the German and UK markets, and we also report the airports that 
serve the largest amounts of relocated traffic in each closure scenario. Additional measures 
are provided to discuss the potential costs for the airline in terms of passenger care. This is 
possible because of the regulations that establish delay thresholds that trigger several 
passenger rights. Therefore, we report the proportion of disrupted passengers for whom the 
airline has a duty of care (departure delays between 2-3 hours), the number of overnight stays 
by relocated passengers (proxy for accommodation expenses), and the proportion of 
passengers who would require ground transfers. We are unable to translate these measures 
into monetary costs due to a lack of data on the average meals, accommodation, and transport 
costs per passenger. However, with enough information, this calculation would be 
straightforward from our reported figures. Reimbursement costs are linked to non-relocated 
passengers, which we have already reported. In theory, delays above five hours also give 
passengers the right to reimbursement, but given the nature of our case study, inbound 
international holiday passengers are less likely to decide not to travel and seek reimbursement 
instead of the alternative itinerary. Given the focus of our paper on disruptive events that can 
certainly be classified as “extraordinary circumstances” (terror, weather, industrial actions), 
we do not include compensation costs either because airlines are exempt.  
Finally, eight linear regressions are carried out to obtain additional insight on the factors 
affecting the quality of passenger recovery at PMI for UK and German markets in scenarios 
17 and 18. The dependent variable is either the departure delay per passenger or the 
proportion of passengers relocated per airline and destination. The explanatory variables are 
original travel time (in days), traffic wave (morning, afternoon, or evening), geographical 
                                                 
3 Recently, British Airways preferred to pay for two-night accommodations for approx. 100 stranded passengers 
in Cyprus after an aircraft had a technical fault rather than to quickly source a new aircraft (Daily Mail, 2016). 
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market (UK or Germany), weekly frequencies to the destination (for either the relevant airline 
or the total for all airlines at PMI), airline type (low-cost or full-service), type of relocation 
(inline or interline), and a set of airline-specific dummy variables (with Germanwings as the 
reference airline). Two sets of specifications are run, one with interactions between airline 
type and geographical market and another with the individual airline dummies. (EasyJet and 
Ryanair are separated for German and UK markets because they have a large presence in 
both.) The total airline frequencies and interline variables are included in the models based on 
scenario 18, where interlining is allowed. 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Simulation results 
Table 6 summarizes the main indicators of passenger disruption for each of the 19 scenarios. 
For short-length closures (2 hours), if airlines allow alternative itineraries involving at least 
one flight connection, rather than employing only non-stop recovery options, non-relocation 
rates are shown to decrease, on average, between 5% and 30% and reduce average passenger 
departure delays between 2 and 6 hours. Passengers disrupted by morning closures benefit the 
most from the increased recovery options due to the availability on onward travel options in 
the same day. In medium-length closures (5-6 hours), the lack of seat capacity makes 
interline cooperation necessary to achieve non-relocation rates below 10%. This leads to 
further improvements in the speed to recovery between 7 and 8 hours per passenger. The 
same delay reductions, however, cannot be achieved by interline cooperation in the full-day 
closure scenario, which remains stable above 34 hours of average departure delay (scenarios 
17 and 18). The non-relocation rate does indeed decrease by approximately 23%, but it does 
not achieve the levels estimated for shorter closures, remaining at 15.6%. The reason is again 
a lack of seat capacity. The fully unrestricted scenario (19) indicates that the lowest possible 
non-relocation rate is 2.9%, and the lowest possible average departure delay is 13 hours and 
55 minutes. This theoretical improvement is consistent with the conclusions of Wang (2007), 
who discusses how high load factors reduce the resilience of an air transport system by 
leaving little free capacity to relocate disrupted passengers. The disaggregated information on 
German and UK markets shows important differences in passenger disruption. In regards to 
improvements in the speed of recovery, German passengers consistently benefit more from 
indirect relocation, interlining, and additional capacity than UK passengers do. On the other 
hand, interline cooperation can always achieve 100% relocation for UK markets in medium-
length closures, regardless of when they occur. Looking at the full-day closures, German 
markets recover more passengers under inline recovery, though these differences are greatly 
reduced after cooperation is allowed.  
From a cost perspective, it is clear that airlines face a tradeoff between reimbursement and 
care/rerouting costs. As expected, a reduction in the non-relocation rate boosts the proportion 
of passengers for whom the airline has a duty of care, alongside the number of overnight 
stays and ground transfers required. Thus, airlines with higher fares (e.g., full-service 
airlines) have a greater incentive to implement measures to reduce the non-relocation rate 
than low-fare carriers. In regards to interlining, an additional cost-saving advantage is the 
significant reduction in average departure delays, which also bring a reduction in average 
overnight stays per relocated passenger. The opportunity to achieve faster and cheaper 
relocations by means of interlining is optimal in medium-length closures, which is when 
airlines still have enough capacity to share. In full-length closures, the massive backlog of 
disrupted passengers can also benefit from interlining, but capacity shortages make that 
process slower.  
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Table 6. Summary of passenger disruption indicators per geographical market and closure scenario 
scenario beginning  
closure 
end  
closure 
  Spain to EEA markets   Spain to UK markets   Spain to Germany markets 
  
dpax %non- 
reloc 
%care nights %grt ddel/pax 
  
dpax %non- 
reloc 
ddel/pax  dpax %non- 
reloc 
ddel/pax 
1 10:00 12:00 
 
4,060 14.9% 82.0% 2,953 39.4% 24 h 10 m 
 
2,694 14.6% 23 h 26 m 
 
751 4.4% 26 h 06 m 
2 10:00 12:00   4,060 4.3% 89.4% 2,309 49.6% 18 h 46 m   2,694 5.2% 20 h 09 m   751 0.0% 18 h 15 m 
3 15:00 17:00 
 
3,022 29.6% 67.0% 1,400 47.6% 16 h 41 m 
 
597 32.8% 14 h 34 m 
 
1,477 18.3% 14 h 36 m 
4 15:00 17:00   3,022 5.5% 90.7% 1,422 51.9% 14 h 03 m   597 6.5% 15 h 54 m   1,477 2.0% 13 h 03 m 
5 22:00 24:00 
 
2,310 36.6% 63.0% 1,904 43.1% 21 h 50 m 
 
1,043 33.3% 21 h 31 m 
 
565 39.5% 11 h 30 m 
6 22:00 24:00   2,310 7.7% 92.2% 2,636 43.2% 19 h 46 m   1,043 0.0% 22 h 25 m   565 18.1% 10 h 51 m 
7 08:00 13:00 
 
11,181 26.0% 73.7% 6,807 37.8% 24 h 13 m 
 
3,605 19.4% 27 h 30 m 
 
5,793 25.7% 21 h 20 m 
8 08:00 13:00 
 
11,181 16.0% 82.2% 6,087 40.6% 20 h 41 m 
 
3,605 14.9% 28 h 27 m 
 
5,793 17.0% 16 h 31 m 
9 08:00 13:00   11,181 2.2% 96.5% 3,850 60.9% 13 h 36 m   3,605 0.0% 18 h 44 m   5,793 4.2% 10 h 20 m 
10 13:00 19:00 
 
9,164 25.6% 74.0% 6,990 37.5% 24 h 55 m 
 
1,432 41.1% 22 h 03 m 
 
5,040 19.7% 26 h 08 m 
11 13:00 19:00 
 
9,164 16.0% 83.3% 6,214 40.1% 20 h 07 m 
 
1,432 31.9% 22 h 51 m 
 
5,040 10.2% 20 h 14 m 
12 13:00 19:00   9,164 2.7% 93.2% 4,883 69.6% 12 h 47 m   1,432 0.0% 15 h 13 m   5,040 0.6% 12 h 11 m 
13 19:00 24:00 
 
8,523 22.2% 77.2% 8,144 36.1% 26 h 47 m 
 
1,938 39.3% 24 h 59 m 
 
4,083 36.7% 23 h 33 m 
14 19:00 24:00 
 
8,523 12.0% 87.2% 8,700 39.4% 21 h 37 m 
 
1,938 10.4% 25 h 51 m 
 
4,083 14.4% 18 h 14 m 
15 19:00 24:00   8,523 6.1% 92.4% 7,691 59.5% 13 h 55 m   1,938 0.0% 14 h 09 m   4,083 12.7% 13 h 35 m 
16 08:00 24:00 
 
28,736 43.9% 56.0% 23,456 28.7% 36 h 06 m 
 
6,968 52.1% 35 h 35 m 
 
14,824 38.6% 37 h 07 m 
17 08:00 24:00 
 
28,736 38.5% 60.6% 24,437 29.1% 34 h 36 m 
 
6,968 47.7% 35 h 49 m 
 
14,824 33.6% 34 h 58 m 
18 08:00 24:00 
 
28,736 15.6% 81.6% 33,739 53.1% 34 h 21 m 
 
6,968 13.3% 34 h 36 m 
 
14,824 14.1% 33 h 44 m 
19 08:00 24:00   28,736 2.9% 94.0% 6,968 67.2% 13 h 18 m   6,968 0.0% 14 h 02 m   14,824 5.0% 13 h 22 m 
Note: dpax = disrupted passengers; %non-reloc = % passengers not relocated within the recovery window; ddel/pax = average departure 
delay per relocated passenger. %care=proportion of disrupted passengers that the airline relocates and has a duty of care.  
%grt=proportion of disrupted passengers that require ground transfers for successful relocation.  Nights=number of overnight stays by 
relocated passengers (a passenger may require more than one night). 
 
Table 7 shows the results of the linear regressions on scenarios 17 and 18 (full-day closures 
with and without interline restrictions). When interlining is not allowed, airline frequencies 
do not have a significant impact on either departure delays or relocation rates. While more 
frequencies create more capacity for inline relocation, they also increase the potential number 
of disrupted passengers in the event of a closure, hence the ambiguous impact. When 
interlining is allowed, the estimated coefficients clearly indicate that the most popular 
destinations (the ones with the highest weekly frequencies; see Table 3) enjoy higher 
relocation rates but also longer departure delays. At an airline level, airlines with more 
frequencies — and thus a larger number of disrupted passengers — experience lower 
relocation rates. Another result that is consistent across specifications is that passengers on 
disrupted afternoon and evening flights have worse prospects of recovery than those on 
disrupted morning flights, which take precedence in our relocation algorithm. For routes 
above the average travel time (approx. 0.1 days), interlining has a negative impact only on 
departure delays per passenger. 
Table 7. Linear regressions for selected scenarios 
Dependent variable Departure delay per passenger 
 
% relocated passengers per airline and destination 
 
Scenario 17 
 
Scenario 18 
 
Scenario 17 
 
Scenario 18 
 
Coeff. s.d.   Coeff. s.d. 
 
Coeff. s.d.   Coeff. s.d. 
 
Coeff. s.d.   Coeff. s.d. 
 
Coeff. s.d.   Coeff. s.d. 
Constant 0.920 0.185 
 
1.091 0.214 
 
0.883 0.143 
 
0.942 0.145 
 
3.922 1.499 
 
0.528 0.372 
 
2.274 1.393 
 
1.268 0.887 
Original travel time 4.646 1.805 
 
2.473 2.022 
 
2.147 1.375 
 
1.750 1.375 
 
2.275 3.139 
 
4.132 3.521 
 
-5.884 8.418 
 
-4.304 8.373 
Weekly frequency (airline) -0.002 0.008 
 
0.007 0.007 
 
-0.004 0.003 
 
-0.003 0.004 
 
0.003 0.012 
 
-0.010 0.013 
 
-0.038 0.012 
 
-0.033 0.012 
Weekly frequency (total) 
      
0.004 0.001 
 
0.004 0.001 
       
0.016 0.004 
 
0.014 0.005 
Afternoon flight 0.289 0.043 
 
0.365 0.045 
 
0.572 0.013 
 
0.565 0.014 
 
-0.270 0.068 
 
-0.293 0.074 
 
-0.138 0.055 
 
-0.129 0.060 
Evening flight 0.542 0.060 
 
0.616 0.057 
 
0.812 0.016 
 
0.811 0.017 
 
-0.649 0.071 
 
-0.672 0.072 
 
-0.296 0.114 
 
-0.362 0.116 
Interline 
      
0.333 0.151 
 
0.375 0.150 
       
-1.150 1.003 
 
-1.110 1.007 
Interline_travel time 
      
-3.568 1.451 
 
-4.052 1.442 
       
11.328 9.523 
 
10.598 9.625 
Full service_UK -0.551 0.092 
    
-0.014 0.033 
    
-0.143 0.246 
    
-0.037 0.162 
   Low Cost_UK 0.112 0.053 
    
0.124 0.016 
    
-0.068 0.087 
    
-0.029 0.058 
   Full Service_DE -0.076 0.050 
    
-0.007 0.018 
    
0.113 0.085 
    
0.002 0.061 
   Air Berlin 
   
-0.160 0.064 
    
-0.028 0.025 
    
0.177 0.117 
    
0.029 0.086 
British Airways 
   
-0.542 0.146 
    
-0.025 0.059 
    
0.463 0.313 
    
0.117 0.208 
Flybe 
   
-0.012 0.223 
    
0.076 0.066 
    
-0.050 0.355 
    
0.422 0.235 
Condor 
   
0.048 0.080 
    
-0.017 0.029 
    
-0.095 0.153 
    
0.136 0.096 
Norwegian 
   
-0.335 1.794 
    
0.130 0.718 
            Iberia 
   
-0.706 0.591 
    
-0.276 0.235 
            Lufthansa 
   
0.521 0.378 
    
-0.150 0.052 
    
-0.511 0.286 
    
-0.019 0.187 
Jet2.com 
   
-0.022 0.095 
    
0.120 0.030 
    
-0.253 0.162 
    
0.042 0.105 
SAS 
   
-0.411 1.796 
    
0.163 0.718 
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Germania 
   
0.363 0.133 
    
0.065 0.043 
    
-0.241 0.211 
    
0.006 0.140 
Thomas Cook 
   
-0.538 0.112 
    
-0.017 0.042 
    
-0.030 0.228 
    
0.058 0.147 
Air Europa 
   
-0.917 0.903 
    
0.089 0.361 
            Vueling 
   
-1.059 0.208 
    
0.170 0.082 
    
0.403 0.459 
    
0.005 0.297 
TUIfly 
   
0.254 0.087 
    
-0.074 0.029 
    
-0.169 0.153 
    
0.040 0.098 
Monarch Airlines 
   
-0.184 0.095 
    
0.126 0.035 
    
0.137 0.188 
    
0.091 0.119 
Ryanair_UK 
   
0.322 0.093 
    
0.173 0.028 
    
-0.325 0.143 
    
-0.029 0.096 
Ryanair_DE 
   
-0.576 0.114 
    
-0.178 0.033 
    
0.202 0.168 
    
0.115 0.111 
Easyjet_UK 
   
0.408 0.086 
    
0.058 0.028 
    
-0.249 0.137 
    
-0.130 0.093 
Easyjet_DE    -0.532 0.128     -0.010 0.046     0.057 0.207     -0.082 0.138 
Number of observations 585 
  
585 
  
873 
  
873 
  
158 
  
158 
  
158 
  
158 
 R-squared 0.206    0.351    0.815    0.825    0.415    0.472    0.398    0.520   
Note: bold denotes significance at 5% level. 
Table 7 also indicates that LCCs (particularly EasyJet and Ryanair) have longer departure 
delays in UK markets than in German markets. These significant differences persist even in 
the interline equations, which tend to show smaller individual effects because airlines are 
effectively sharing their seat capacity. Ryanair also has a significantly lower proportion of 
inline relocated passengers in UK markets. (EasyJet’s negative effect is significant at a 10% 
level.) On the other hand, full-service carriers in the UK (which handle a minority of traffic) 
have lower departure delays than German ones.  
Further details on the performance of individual airlines when restricted to their own 
airline/partnership/alliance networks is provided in Figures 4 and 5 (for German and UK 
markets, respectively) and in Table 8. Note how EasyJet and Ryanair recover less than the 
market average of its disrupted UK and German passengers due to the lack of seat capacity in 
their networks. On the other hand, the recovery rates of low-cost/hybrid carriers Air Berlin 
(member of Oneworld), Germanwings (owned by Lufthansa), and Vueling (partnered with 
Iberia and British Airways) are higher than the respective market averages. Furthermore, in 
the regression analysis, these figures suggest that airline partnerships boost the resilience of 
LCCs’ flight networks since they provide additional onward connectivity for rerouting 
passengers. In addition, note how airlines in German markets show a more consistent quality 
and speed of recovery than their UK counterparts, and the busiest German airlines have better 
relocation rates than the busiest UK ones. This evidence also suggests an asymmetry in the 
quality of relocation between the main geographical markets in PMI in the absence of 
interline cooperation. 
Table 8. Airline relocation rates in scenario 17 
UK market 
 
Germany market 
Airline Code dpax %reloc 
 
Airline Code dpax %reloc 
Easyjet U2 2,188 38.8% 
 
Air Berlin AB 7,737 68.6% 
Ryanair FR 1,739 39.4% 
 
Germanwings 4U 1,641 67.9% 
Jet2.com LS 1,506 53.3% 
 
Condor DE 1,447 81.8% 
Monarch ZB 673 89.3% 
 
TUIfly X3 1,265 61.3% 
Thomas Cook TCX 416 88.9% 
 
Ryanair FR 1,001 46.7% 
British Airways BA 176 100.0% 
 
Germania ST 484 52.7% 
Flybe BE 139 51.1% 
 
Easyjet U2 457 57.8% 
Air Europa UX 4 100.0% 
 
Lufthansa  LH 219 10.5% 
Vueling VY 2 100.0% 
 
Vueling  VY 81 100.0% 
Note: dpax = disrupted passengers; %reloc = % passengers relocated within the recovery window. 
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Figure 4. Hourly distribution of passenger relocation for individual airlines: German market (Scenario 17)  
Source: Own elaboration 
 
 
Figure 5. Hourly distribution of passenger relocation for individual airlines: UK market (Scenario 17)  
Source: Own elaboration 
Table 9 provides information on the proportion of disrupted passengers from the largest 
airlines than could potentially take advantage of a cooperative agreement to share seat 
capacity (full relocation matrix in Appendix A). The main conclusion from this matrix is that 
there are no substantial imbalances between seats given to and seats taken from the pool. The 
heterogeneous distribution of flight schedules across the week allows all airlines to both 
contribute to and benefit from a hypothetical agreement. For example, Air Berlin, which has 
by far the largest number of frequencies at PMI for the markets under study, only provides 
minimum-delay itineraries for 38.3% of its relocated passengers, while 11.3% of passengers 
could be served better by Condor’s spare capacity. Conversely, Air Berlin could 
accommodate 25.8% of Condor passengers. This perspective of mutual benefit from the 
collaborative scheme is bound to facilitate negotiations between the airlines. 
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Table 9. Interline relocation matrix between largest airlines in scenario 18 
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Disrupted airline  code AB VY FR U2 UX DE TCX 4U X3 HG IB ZB LS 
Air Berlin AB 38.3% 9.4% 5.2% 1.9% 2.7% 11.3% 0.0% 7.1% 5.6% 1.8% 2.3% 0.7% 0.0% 
Ryanair FR 21.4% 6.8% 7.1% 8.7% 4.9% 1.1% 8.2% 3.2% 1.0% 3.3% 3.7% 5.9% 5.2% 
Easyjet U2 8.8% 7.1% 12.3% 16.7% 8.3% 0.1% 15.1% 3.2% 0.4% 1.9% 2.3% 5.5% 7.4% 
Germanwings 4U 53.3% 5.2% 2.8% 0.5% 4.4% 5.3% 0.0% 8.5% 9.0% 5.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Jet2.com LS 11.8% 13.9% 18.3% 8.6% 15.5% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 12.4% 3.3% 7.7% 
Condor DE 25.8% 5.5% 3.0% 9.1% 6.2% 1.4% 8.5% 9.4% 6.1% 0.5% 0.0% 4.5% 1.5% 
TUIfly X3 20.1% 11.7% 3.7% 6.0% 2.2% 17.1% 8.4% 2.9% 9.4% 4.9% 0.4% 0.9% 0.0% 
Monarch ZB 3.1% 9.8% 9.2% 3.4% 16.2% 0.0% 3.9% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 4.5% 13.5% 10.3% 
Vueling VY 9.3% 40.7% 2.1% 4.9% 3.2% 0.0% 0.0% 6.1% 3.5% 1.2% 7.9% 11.1% 0.0% 
NIKI HG 4.6% 2.6% 0.0% 2.5% 0.0% 22.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 63.4% 4.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
Thomas Cook TCX 19.5% 4.3% 10.1% 20.4% 7.7% 0.0% 22.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.2% 12.7% 
In regards to the implementation of airline recovery strategies, regardless of the extent of 
collaboration, it must be clarified that the scope of the disruption extends well beyond the 
airport originally affected. To illustrate this, Table 10 shows the top-ten airports that 
experience the highest increase in passenger departures as a result of the modelled recovery 
process for both UK and German markets in Scenarios 17 and 18. In Scenario 17 (without 
collaboration), the busiest alternate airports correlate with the top destinations served by the 
airlines at PMI. Beyond flight frequency, the alternate airport’s geographic location plays an 
important role in allowing convenient onward travel by rail or road (less than 130 min to the 
passenger’s final destination). This explains, for example, how Manchester Airport (within 
short reach of other popular destinations, such as Birmingham, East Midlands, Leeds, and 
Liverpool) is present in the highest proportion of delay-minimizing itineraries for UK 
stranded passengers. In the scenario with collaboration (18), two interesting results are 
observed: 1) the role of primary European hubs, such as Heathrow and Frankfurt, as potential 
gateways for passenger recovery and 2) the increased concentration in disrupted passenger 
shares handled by alternate airports. This is evident from Table 10, as the aggregate share of 
top-ten alternates increases from 27.3% to 76.2% in the UK markets because of cooperation. 
This presents many advantages in terms of resource planning in the event of a closure 
because any planned investments towards improving resilience can be focused in fewer 
places, with fewer stakeholders involved.  
Table 10. Top-ten busiest alternative airports for selected geographical markets and scenarios 
UK scenario 17 
 
UK scenario 18 
 
Germany scenario 17 
 
Germany scenario 18 
Alternate ∆pax %dpax 
 
Alternate ∆pax %dpax 
 
Alternate ∆pax %dpax 
 
Alternate ∆pax %dpax 
Manchester 523 7.5% 
 
Heathrow 1,214 17.4% 
 
Dusseldorf 1,758 11.9% 
 
Frankfurt 2,072 14.0% 
Stansted 239 3.4% 
 
Manchester 909 13.0% 
 
Berlin Tegel 972 6.6% 
 
Dusseldorf 1,605 10.8% 
East Midlands 227 3.3% 
 
Dublin 560 8.0% 
 
Frankfurt 861 5.8% 
 
Berlin Tegel 1,034 7.0% 
Gatwick 158 2.3% 
 
Stansted 496 7.1% 
 
Koln/Bonn 841 5.7% 
 
Hamburg 1,012 6.8% 
Edinburgh 155 2.2% 
 
Birmingham 413 5.9% 
 
Munich 811 5.5% 
 
Munich 715 4.8% 
Dublin 153 2.2% 
 
Gatwick 378 5.4% 
 
Stuttgart 746 5.0% 
 
Stuttgart 687 4.6% 
Brussels 146 2.1% 
 
Ibiza 372 5.3% 
 
Hamburg 708 4.8% 
 
Brussels 664 4.5% 
Luton 109 1.6% 
 
Amsterdam 341 4.9% 
 
Nuremberg 436 2.9% 
 
Zurich 623 4.2% 
Liverpool 97 1.4% 
 
Barcelona 324 4.6% 
 
Brussels 386 2.6% 
 
Barcelona 546 3.7% 
Ibiza 94 1.3%   Edinburgh 304 4.4%   Madrid 348 2.3%   Koln/Bonn 480 3.2% 
Note: Δpax = increase in departures with respect to baseline travel dataset; %dpax = % of disrupted passengers relocated via the airport. 
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 Figure 6. Ground transfers from Frankfurt to onward German destinations (Scenario 18)  
Source: Own elaboration 
Amongst other factors, the role of large European hubs in improving the quality of airline 
recovery is built upon good intermodal connectivity with neighbouring regions. This is 
shown by investigating how Frankfurt airport processes the 2,072 relocated passengers it 
receives in Scenario 18. Our simulation output indicates that 1,550 of these passengers 
continue their travel by rail or road (Figure 6). This expands the scope of the policy 
discussion on air transport resilience at tourist destinations and effectively links it to the high-
level objectives of improving intermodality and airport accessibility currently defined by the 
European Commission (EC, 2014).     
5.2 Implications 
These results have many policy and managerial implications. From the point of view of the 
airlines serving the tourist destination, the improvement in the quality of relocation can be 
expected to reduce the likelihood of negative word-of-mouth being generated and increase 
the loyalty of the disrupted passengers. Resilience planning should be an integral part of 
managerial decision-making, as a single disruption at a major destination can have damaging 
impacts on passenger numbers in the future and require substantial marketing efforts to 
restore the trust of consumers. In that regard, shortening passengers’ waiting time at the 
airport and achieving a more consistent quality of recovery across geographical markets can 
improve the perception of “fairness” associated to the recovery process (Akamavi et al., 
2016). Any additional effort towards collaboration between airlines at the disrupted airport, 
as well as with further agents in onward destinations, will be evident to the disrupted 
passengers and, via the moderation effect of “controllability” (Nibkin et al., 2015), also help 
make the recovery process more satisfying. These results also contribute to the literature in 
regards to the positive impact of multi-party collaboration within a context of tourism crisis 
management (Xu and Grunewald, 2009). In this regard, we conclude that interline 
cooperation works optimally in medium-length closures (5-6 hours), which is when airlines 
still have sufficient capacity to recover quickly. In full-day closures, cooperation is also 
beneficial, but capacity restrictions make the process of sharing capacity slower. 
Furthermore, it is important that the negotiations to establish an airline cooperation scheme 
be grounded upon the realization that airlines can both benefit from and contribute seats to 
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delay-minimizing recovery itineraries, despite the differences in the individual airline 
recovery profiles.  
The airport will experience increased non-aeronautical revenues due to longer passenger 
dwelling times, particularly in the event on longer closures (of course, where the airport is not 
evacuated because of the disruption). However, the airport also has incentives to improve the 
quality of relocation in order to prevent substantial damage to future passenger traffic during 
its peak period, upon which the financial viability of the airport may critically depend. 
Despite the dominance of LCCs, passengers in holiday markets such as the ones investigated 
in this study tend to travel with the maximum of their baggage allowance. Therefore, the 
implementation in baggage transfer protocols among the disrupted airlines in a context of 
shared capacity is an important aspect. In the absence of said collaboration, our estimates on 
the hourly relocation rates per airline suggest that the airport should be prepared to 
accommodate a large number of passengers within the terminal, particularly in the first 24 
hours after the flights resume. The introduction of a system to separate the passengers to be 
immediately relocated (and mixed with the new passenger departures) from those with longer 
waiting times is also advised. While our case study refers to an island airport with no 
alternate airports reachable by road or rail, in other instances, (e.g., Sicily, Cyprus) additional 
efforts to facilitate ground transfers should be implemented. 
From the point of view of local tourism authorities, we recall the suggestion from Ritchie 
(2008), who prompts destination management organizations to assist stakeholders in 
developing crisis management plans, with explicit knowledge of the effects, barriers and 
facilitating factors in relation to the implementation of these plans. We aim to provide 
intelligence on some of these factors, including the impact of multi-party cooperation in 
reducing passenger delays and airlines’ incentives to take part in these agreements. Another 
contribution of this paper is to illustrate how airports and airlines at tourist destinations do not 
operate in isolation from larger-scale air transport networks, and even those do not operate in 
isolation from other transport modes. Therefore, the process of resilience planning transcends 
the national boundaries of the destination airport and needs to include other stakeholders, 
such as airports and rail operators from the main passenger markets, which can greatly 
improve the speed of recovery. Indeed, we show how air/rail combinations can offer a 
minimum-delay alternative for stranded passengers due to the shortage of airline seat capacity 
to travel to their final destinations. In view of recent events, we suggest the development of a 
European-wide framework for air transport resilience planning with a particular focus on 
those countries with substantial outbound traffic to tourism destinations in the Mediterranean. 
Moreover, in anticipation of possible differences in the quality of relocation across the main 
geographical markets served at the airport, engaging with the relevant country’s media is 
advised to help contextualize the challenges faced by airports and airlines. Following the 
recommendation from Tsai and Chen (2010), public authorities should aim to shine a light on 
cases of good management performance (particularly selling the ideas of collaboration 
between the actors involved) to help build confidence about the destination. 
Finally, it is worth commenting on the relevance of our methodology to other European 
tourist destinations, particularly in view of the simplified approach to passenger relocation 
forced by insularity and the lack of either alternative airports or ground transport options. 
While every airport is unique in its location, scale of operations, airline and destination 
mixes, there are fundamental similarities that indicate that our proposed method can be 
adapted to other case studies. For example, the closure of the only airports in the islands of 
Crete (Heraklion), Rhodes, Malta, Ibiza, Menorca, and the Canary Islands (except Tenerife) 
would present passengers and airlines with a similar challenge to PMI. In addition, multi-
airport islands are vulnerable to multi-airport closures. In the case of Corsica, with four major 
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commercial airports, we can mention the strike by Air France and Corse Mediterranée in 
2007, which paralyzed air traffic to/from the island (Europa Press, 2007). Other European 
islands, such as Tenerife and Cyprus, have the particularity that all their airports are operated 
by the same company. Therefore, the possibility of a multi-airport industrial action that 
paralyzes all air traffic cannot be discounted. Additionally, since the provision of ATC 
services is commonly handled at a nationwide level in Europe, ATC strikes typically affect 
more than one airport (if not all) in the same country, thus also reducing the recovery options 
in these cases. Another possibility, in the event of a terrorist attack, is that all airports and 
seaports in an island destination are closed in order to have the perpetrators “caged in”, as 
occurred at PMI in 2009. While very rare in the Mediterranean islands, multi-airport closures 
can also be correlated for weather reasons. This factor could make a weather-related closure 
at Keflavik (Iceland) comparable, in terms of lack of transport alternatives, to our PMI case. 
6. SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Recent years have witnessed a number of events (weather-related, industrial actions, or 
terrorism) that have affected the robustness of air transport services, leading to airport 
closures and flight cancellations that have left air travelers in general (and holidaymakers in 
particular) stranded at major airports. However, to date, there is no study in the tourism crisis 
management literature that analyzes the passenger recovery process in the event of an airport 
closure at a major tourist destination and its implications in terms of speed of recovery, 
fairness, resilience, and multi-party collaboration. To fill this gap, a case study of Palma de 
Mallorca Airport, the busiest tourism-oriented island airport in Europe, is presented. Using an 
MIDT dataset on passenger itineraries that included flights in August 2014, several closure 
scenarios are simulated, and disrupted passengers are relocated to minimum-delay itineraries. 
Average departure delays and relocation rates are used to assess the impact of each scenario, 
with a particular focus on the UK and Germany markets.  
The results provide useful benchmarks for the development of policies aimed at minimizing 
the impact on stranded tourists. From a cost perspective, it is clear that airlines face a clear 
tradeoff between reimbursement and care/rerouting costs. Therefore, airlines with higher 
fares (e.g., full-service) will have a greater incentive than low-fare carriers to implement 
measures that improve the relocation rate. In that regard, if airlines allow relocation 
itineraries involving at least one flight connection, rather than employing only non-stop 
recovery options, relocation rates are shown to improve, on average, between 5% and 30% 
and reduce average passenger delays up to 6 hours. In medium- and full-day closures (more 
than 5 hours), the lack of seat capacity makes interline cooperation necessary to achieve non-
relocation rates below 16%. In terms of departure delays, the benefits of cooperation are 
highest for medium-length closures (between 5-6 hours) due to capacity constraints. We also 
show that all affected airlines can benefit from collaboration and contribute seats 
simultaneously, which suggests that they will have incentives to participate in such a plan. A 
detailed analysis of how passenger flows are redistributed throughout the European air 
transport network reveals the airports where airlines should direct their investment in 
resilience plans due to their central location within the shortest path lengths between PMI and 
its major destinations. In a scenario of full airline collaboration, investments should be 
directed at major European hubs (such as Heathrow or Frankfurt) that allow good onward 
connectivity via air, rail, or road. A second-stage regression reveals significant differences in 
the performance of full-service vs LCCs in terms of departure delays, which also depend on 
the geographic market. LCCs serving UK markets have a worse recovery performance than 
their German counterparts. German passengers tend to benefit more from indirect relocation, 
interlining, and additional capacity than UK passengers. Looking at full-day closures, 
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German markets recover more passengers under inline recovery, though the country 
differences are reduced after cooperation is allowed. 
These results have many policy and managerial implications. From the point of view of 
airlines, the improvement in the quality of relocation will reduce the likelihood of negative 
word-of-mouth being generated and increase the loyalty of the disrupted passengers. From 
the airport perspective, the implementation of baggage transfer protocols among the disrupted 
airlines in a context of shared capacity is an important aspect. Separating the passengers to be 
immediately relocated from those with longer waiting times is also advised. Furthermore, this 
paper suggests that local tourism authorities must engage as facilitators between all 
stakeholders to develop appropriate resilience plans, with the ultimate goal to protect the 
image of the destination for the future. The process of planning and negotiation, however, 
transcends the national boundaries of the destination airport and needs to include other 
stakeholders, such as airports and rail operators from the main passenger markets, which can 
greatly improve the speed of recovery. In view of recent events, we suggest the development 
of a European-wide framework for air transport resilience planning with a particular focus on 
countries with substantial outbound traffic to tourism destinations in the Mediterranean.  
Finally, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of our model, particularly in regards to 
the implementation of additional service recovery measures by airlines, such as delaying 
flights in the case of shorter closures. Aircraft and crew recovery decisions that take into 
account maintenance and labor rules restrictions could also be included by adapting the 
methods suggested by the operations research literature. Future work could also introduce a 
set of criteria to prioritize different options of passenger recovery across layers (e.g., the 
airline, alliances, interline partners, other airlines) in order to model the passenger 
rescheduling process in a more realistic fashion. This can be achieved by incorporating the 
published IROPS (Irregular Operations) guidelines for the major carriers into the 
rescheduling algorithm. Furthermore, the analysis of intermodal connections can be expanded 
with the addition of rail schedules and capacities at a European level. With enough 
information on passenger preferences, we could also improve our algorithm by introducing 
the maximum acceptable delays per passenger type (depending on, e.g., travel distance, 
destination type, and booking class), beyond which rerouting will be rejected and 
reimbursement will be sought, with the objective to bring our simulations closer to real-world 
passenger decision-making. Finally, further research could simulate a number of case studies 
covering the tourist airports in the Mediterranean region and develop a ranking of airport, 
airline, and route criticality to guide strategic decision-making in the area of tourism crisis 
management.  
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APPENDIX A. Complete interline relocation matrix in Scenario 18 
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AB VY FR U2 UX DE TCX 4U X3 HG IB ZB LS DY SK TOM HV LX HQ TB QS BA LG WK AP LH V7 ST BE EI BV SN W6 FB SX KL Total 
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